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Rationing Access to
Medical Care:
Some Sober Second Thoughts
by

Richard A. Epstein

MARKETS IN THE FACE

OF NEED

To what extent
should access to
health care be
determined by
market
mechanisms?

The subject of this essay is a
familiar topic: to what extent
should access to health care be
determined by market mechanisms? Today there is so little
support for the use of these mechanisms that it is all too easy to
forget why markets work as well as
they do in most situations. Markets are institutions with
only one engine for improvement in social life: voluntary
exchanges by self-interested parties for their mutual benefit. Let any set of initial endowments be well-defined,
then the observed exchanges from those endowments
must benefit all parties to them. When transactions do
not take place, it is for one of two reasons: either the cost
of transacting is sufficiently great to negate the potential
gains from exchange,1 or there isno price of exchange that

Richard A. Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, and an editor of the
Journalof Law and Economics.

allows both parties to be better off
than they were before: at every
point the seller's cost is greater
than the buyer's gain. The market, while legal, closes down.
When transactions fail for
the first reason, the result is unfortunate. When they fail for the
second reason, the result is desirable. The reason for the difference
is this: in the first case, the deal that does not take place
is one that would increase value. In the second, the deal
that does not take place is one that would decrease value.
In practice it is difficult to decide by observation which of
these two reasons account for the failure of any particular
transaction. But as a matter of social policy there is no
reason to examine failed transactions on a case by case
basis. The proper global strategy is to reduce the overall
level of transaction costs so as to make it more probable
that the transactions that abort are those that would not
take place even in a zero transaction cost world. In some
cases, such as sales of a business, that strategy calls for
contracts to be put in writing; in some, as with trades on
the futures market, it is to encourage informal dispute
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resolution by cooperatives and trade associations; and in
some, such as real estate mortgages, it is to use systems of
recordation that make property rights more definite. The
use of one strategy to control transaction costs in any
given setting does not preclude another. Whatever the
set of appropriate responses in a particular setting, the
overall strategy is clear: voluntary transactions that do
occur are ordinarily welcome because everyone benefits.
Transaction costs are unwelcome because of the barriers
that they throw up to exchange.
This transactional model works well to explain
what is good and bad in the organization of labor markets,
housing markets, and financial markets-or so I would
argue. But even the strongest defender of the market
faith has to blanch visibly when the logic of voluntary
exchanges is applied to a newborn infant left malnourished on the doorstep of a public hospital. Clearly there
is no capacity for the archtypical voluntary exchange
that drives the market. Yet deep in our bones we (and it
is the primordial, collective "we") are convinced that the
benefits that can be conferred upon the child in distress
far outweigh the costs, necessarily borne by others, that
are necessary to respond to the particular case. No matter
how powerful the analytical case for saying that comparisons of utility cannot be made between persons, virtually
no one holds fast to that belief as an operating assumption
when faced with the stark reality of vulnerable infants
abandoned on the doorstep of a hospital on a cold winter
day. This is not a case where the want of willingness or
ability to pay-often the decisive market test--marks a
lack of value. On matters of health care, wealth maximization is a very bad proxy for utility maximization, and
where the two diverge the former gives way to the latter.'
Judge Posner gives an illustration of a pituitary extract of
modest use to the child of a rich family, but of great use
to the child of a poor family, who without it will become
a dwarf. He then concludes: "In the sense of value used
in this book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the
rich than to the poor family, because value is measured by
willingness to pay; but the extract would confer greater
happiness in the hands of the poor family than in the
hands of the rich one."4 It is far from clear that the
equation of value with wealth instead of utility, however,
captures anyone's intuitive sense of the term. Posner
himself is aware of the limitations of his argument,
although he is unwilling to make any adjustments to deal
with it.'
The health cases bring the tension between wealth
and utility to the fore. The proper relationship between
them and some ultimate criterion of value is, I think, as
follows. As a matter of first principle, utility, not wealth,

is the better theoretical measure of what value is. But by
the same token utility is difficult to isolate and measure.
In most contexts the willingness to pay, or to work, is as
a good a proxy for utility as one is able to identify. By
necessity, it becomes a rough-and-ready substitute for
some ultimate concept of utility, which in general proves
unworkable in practice. Notwithstanding the general
tension between these two measures, voluntary contracts
stand in a preferred place under both regimes. Where
they take place we can be confident that each side has
moved to a higher indifference curve (i.e., to a greater
level of utility) than he held before; otherwise consent

We should be aware of the
hidden perils associated with
forced provision of medical
care.
would not be forthcoming. By the same token, especially
in dealings with strangers, it is difficult to see how private
utility can advance while overall social wealth isreduced.
In principle, people often enter into transactions that
leave them both happier, on the one hand, and less
wealthy on the other. That is the meaning of a consumption transaction. But for any given level of consumption,
people will normally seek to spend as little wealth as
possible. They purchase goods in the market because it
is cheaper to buy and consume than to produce and
consume. Since these contracts are positive sum transactions, they should in the aggregate raise wealth, not
reduce it. Thus, the protagonists of wealth and utility
both converge on the proposition that voluntary agreements should ordinarily be enforced unless there is some
strong negative third party effect, as occurs with cartel
and price-fixing arrangements. The defenders of voluntary markets, myself included, thus revel in the idea that
one good idea-voluntary exchange-applied in countless transactions yields far better social results than the
endless array of bad regulatory ideas that all too often
move resources from higher to lower valued uses, creating
private resistance and public disillusion along the way.
The differences between wealth and utility, however, surge to the fore in connection with those situations
in which voluntary exchanges cannot take place. If
wealth is the test of value, then the lives of the penniless
are of no worth, so there is no concern with the transactions that fail to take place because of the inability to
purchase. But if wealth is thought only to be a proxy for
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utility, it then becomes far more plausible to say that
wealth is a proxy worth using only where there is reason
to believe that it provides us with some suitable approximation of the underlying good. However, that proxy is
highly flawed in situations seen frequently in medical
care cases, where need is great but wealth is absent. The
difficulty for any theory that equates utility with value is
that the gains in utility obtainable by one-sided transfers
cannot be captured by a set of market exchanges that
uniformly require both sides to benefit.
The following question then arises: where voluntary exchange presupposes a level of wealth that is not
available on one side of the transaction, what should be
done to make markets, or the social order more generally,
responsive to the gap between need and wealth?
The modem response to this problem is one that
calls for vast levels of government intervention. Such
intervention requires hospitals and other health care
providers to extend at their own expense medical services
to persons who are in need but cannot pay. Recent
COBRA legislation6 is representative of this modem
view. It demands that hospitals admit and take care of
women who are in active labor and people who are in a
medical emergency until the medical condition is "stabilized" and alternative care can be provided. However,
the COBRA statute contains no provision that provides
any specific financial reimbursement for the hospitals on
whom it imposes its duties. If some form of coverage,
private or public, is available, then the hospital may
claim it in the usual way. But if coverage is not available,
then the hospital has to pay for the care out of its own
resources, and in addition must bear the further cost of
postponing elective care for paying patients in the
process.
The absence of the carrot invites the heavy use of
the stick. The obligations that are imposed by virtue of
the COBRA statute are quite extensive, and the penalties that may be imposed for nonconformity with them
can be quite steep. Not only are fines or malpractice
actions routinely available, but it is also possible for the
United States or the various states to impose heavy
administrative and regulatory sanctions on hospitals.
Sanctions can also include the termination and suspension from Medicare, whose fraction of the overall health
care market is so large that no modem hospital can forgo
participation in the program and remain financially
viable. Yet the statute contains no discernible standards
that link imposition of the sanctions to the severity of the
offense.' A form of administrative lawlessness is thus
used to enforce the newly created access right, a right that
is fully unfunded by the Congress that created it.

CHOOSING THE MIX: EXCHANGE,
COERCION, AND CHARITY
The central question of this paper is whether the
modem transition from markets to coercion may be made
as comfortably and smoothly as its supporters appear to
believe, even if we accept the sharp disjunction between
wealth and value in the context of health care. In the
end, I think that the answer to this question is no, and
that we should be aware of the hidden perils associated
with forced provision of medical care. These perils may
be as great, if not greater, than those generated by a
system of medical care that operates without government
coercion.
In order to understand the possible sources of difficulties, it is necessary to keep in mind two fundamental
caveats: first, in any social setting the question is not
whether any institutional arrangement is beset with
imperfections. They all are, and the only question worth
asking addresses the relative magnitude of the imperfections at hand. Second, the provisional definition of a
market, as a set of voluntary exchanges that work to the
joint benefit of the parties, is somewhat narrower than is
appropriate for this context. Market exchanges and
government coercion do not exhaust the universe of
possibilities. The third possibility is the charitable provision of medical goods and services, which remains an
important component of modem medical care that cannot be overlooked in examining the right of access to
medical care.
Choosing the right rules of access to medical care is
vexing; the proper inquiry is one that addresses the
proper mix of exchange, regulation and charity. My own
view is that the line between for-profit medical care and
charitable medical care is forever blurry, and that there
never will be a time when medical institutions will not
subsidize needy patients. But the line between coercion
and voluntarism raises very different issues. The case for
governmental guarantees of an access right rests too
much upon the vivid illustrations of desperately needed
care that is supplied to people without means.' Too little
attention is paid to the long term and indirect institutional effects of these practices, which create as many
long term difficulties for the provision of medical care as
they eliminate. The situation here is a familiar one. The
level of funds spent on health care, be it as a percentage
of GNP or in actual dollars, is higher today than it has
ever been before, and higher by far than it is in any other
comparable country. The figure in the United States was
around 12% ofGNP in 1989, compared with 5% in 1960,
and 8% in 1975; it is undoubtedly even higher today.9
Similarly, the United States spends a larger percentage of
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its GNP on health care than does Canada, even though
the Canadian system involves the universal provision of
medical care without regard to ability to pay and funds its
system with tax revenues." That system has serious
defects of its own that cannot be ignored in any social
reckoning.
Notwithstanding the enormous expansion in health
expenditures in the United States, the gains in health
fairly attributable to this expansion are hard to identify,
whether in terms of the overall health of the population,
or in terms of an increase in the expected life of our
people. The degree of dissatisfaction with the American
system is higher now than it has ever been. There are
calls for reform that look north with envy, although the
Canadian system has more difficulties than is perceived
south of the border." I wish I could believe that a system
of government provided care could satisfy the demands
for superior care at bargain prices. But I fear that this
Canadian transplant would not do well on American soil
even if (as there seems reason to doubt) it has done well
in the place of its original birth. The existing structure of
governmental and medical institutions will simply not
permit the level of government domination of the health
care industry that has been possible in Canada.
THE POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE SIDE OF
MARKETS
To understand the difficulties with this absolute
right to health care it is necessary to conceive of the
theory of markets in two separate ways. First, there is the
normative theory. This theory explains why markets will
or will not achieve the optimal allocation of resources. In
contrast, the positive theory asks a somewhat different
question: how do people respond to the incentives they
face in a particular setting, given their own individual
self-interest? The normative argument in this context is
designed to show that' markets cannot work perfectly
when great need is separated from the resources to satisfy
it. Even though this argument has undeniable force,
there is still the question of how health care markets will
operate once the right to access at public expense is
guaranteed. The imperfections must be taken into account.
The first problem that must be faced is how to
ration health care if the inability to pay is regarded as an
insufficient reason to deny people needed health care.
With markets in place people are forced to make choices
between the care they receive and the price they must
pay. In some cases these choices are clearly unpleasant,
but a system of markets is sufficiently powerful to facilitate long term health care arrangements that do not

require people to make uneasy market judgments on a
case by case basis. For instance, they can pay some sort
of a flat fee and then turn to administrative solutions
within the firm to decide what care is given and how.
That is the logic of the HMO and similar health plans.
When this approach is taken, the incentive to ration
resources is not eliminated, but is only transferred from
patients to entrepreneurs. The right of access to medical
care, however, does not place any discipline on the
decision to demand health care. In principle, each
person will seek health care until the net benefit of some
additional unit is zero. In practice this extreme conclu-

The right of access to
medical care does not
place any discipline on the
decision to demand health
care.
sion will be modified, as there are always some private
costs to receiving health care even if it is freely provided:
time is one element, and the possible risks of treatment
are clearly another. But, for these purposes, we can ignore
these additional constraints to see how a system would
work if its ideal-all needed care at zero price-were
achieved.
The answer is predictable. The care here still costs
money, and it has to be provided out of general tax
revenues. Those taxes are in turn imposed upon someone, where they create the usual distortions in other
markets by imposing the kind of barriers to exchange that
frustrate the efficiency of voluntary markets. The recent
New York Times account dutifully notes, "Already the
southbound Peace Bridge from Ontario to Buffalo is
crowded with shoppers driving to avoid sales taxes totalling 15%, which have been driven up in part by health
expenses." 2 Since the taxes are borne by the public at
large, and the benefits are obtained by individuals, we can
be confident there will be overconsumption of health
care services. This conclusion remains even if it is
assumed that wealth should be no obstacle to the receipt
of health care, for if individuals received sufficient funds
for health care, and were allowed to spend it on any good
they chose, some of it, perhaps much of it, would not be
spent on health care. Perhaps it would be spent on other
goods that promise (in subjective terms) greater utility to
their holder than medical care. Therefore, the effort to
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have public funding of unlimited access trades in the
problem of lack of access to the problem of lack of
funding. It does not bring a stable equilibrium, either in
markets or politics, to the provision of health care.
The Canadian system offers a useful illustration
because it seeks to control funding through government
budgets. However, in so doing, it creates a situation in
which its expenditure figures are somewhat misleading;
they only give a snapshot view of the system. First,
patients in Canada who cannot gain immediate access to
the system report considerable pain and discomfort because of delays in care provision.3 The pain, suffering,
and loss of income are not registered in the Canadian
calculus because they are not transfer payments, even if
they are social costs. Their inclusion, however, would
drive up the costs of its system, both in absolute terms and
relative to the American system. In addition, the Canadian access rules have a perverse effect on patient behavior and treatment. If individuals were able to purchase
care cheaply in a voluntary market, they would obtain
medical care before a medical condition became serious,
thereby avoiding major losses. But under the Canadian
system, rationing forces the less serious cases to the back
of the queue until they become more serious. Queues are
a bad way to ration, whether we speak of gasoline or
health care. Finally, the long term condition of the
Canadian health care system has to be at risk, given the
tendency to procure funding for current treatments, and
not for long term capital expenses. Thus, eliminating a
price system has some genuine effects. What are the
possible substitutes?
FINDING SUBSTITUTES FOR PRICE
The obvious source ofdiscipline within must be for
some proxy that will substitute for the ability to pay
certain medical services. It is possible to develop these
proxies and to rigorously apply them, but the consequences will be unwelcome. It iscostly to provide kidney
dialysis machines, and therefore it is necessary to decide
who will receive what care if these are not put out to bid.
One possibility is to have special committees decide
whose life is worth saving and whose life is not, but after
a while the people who serve on these committees will
learn that playing God in a world of imponderables is
4
extremely difficult.'
So one shifts to some other system of allocation.
Kidney dialysis could be allocated to all persons who are
under a certain age on the theory that the longer the
expected life and the better the expected health, the
more likely kidney dialysis will do some good. Schemes
of this sort are used in Great Britain and in Canada to

allocate kidneys in a more or less arbitrary fashion, and no
one can claim that they invariably provide the treatment
to the persons who can most benefit from it. More to the
point, it seems clear that a system of this sort has no
political future in this country. The widespread support
for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act rests in
part on the belief that it is arbitrary to rely on the
"stereotypes" of age to determine who shall keep a job and
who shall be fired.15 There is said to be a market failure
in the common practice that tied job tenure to age. If age
will not work in that market, then there is no reason to
suppose it will work in the context of kidney dialysis or
any other treatment.
Our political system stipulates that all recipients
are of equal need regardless of anticipated benefits. The
current rules in the United States make it clear that, in
principle, all persons are eligible to receive treatment,
and there would be a major political uproar if the dialysis
that is now available was suddenly removed because of

People will consume too
much of any good, even
medical care, if others are
burdened with its costs.
the adoption of a system of comprehensive access to
medical services for all persons. This will not happen.
The rough surrogates that are used to ration access in
other socialized systems cannot be adopted in this country. Ifthe services are rendered universal, there will be no
way to exclude any part of the population from them on
grounds of age or other formal characteristics. The
problem of overconsumption of medical services is not
easily overcome.
What other devices could be used to reach this
goal? A second strategy that was adopted under the
Canadian and the British systems is budgetary. The way
to limit access to medical care is to limit the amount of
money that is appropriated to that end, and then to
require medical authorities to make their allocations
between new hospitals, new equipment and general
access. The budgets are kept low, but the queues are kept
long and the quality of service is far below what most
Americans regard as acceptable. I doubt very much that
our system of guaranteed access could by accompanied by
the same level of budgetary rigor. So once need determines the level of care, and budgets are then determined

FALL 1991

HeinOnline -- 3 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 85 1991

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
to satisfy those needs, the problem of overconsumption is
again not overcome. People will consume too much of
any good, even medical care, if others are burdened with
its costs. The descriptive and predictive power of economic theory remains even if wealth is not a suitable
proxy for utility.

MORAL HAZARD: THE UNSPOKEN RISK
A second problem that must be addressed head-on
is a familiar feature in the world of insurance. Moral
hazard arises where there is risk that individuals are more
likely to engage in dangerous activities with insurance
than they would without. This problem exists in the
health area (where indeed it was first isolated), for behind
any promise of a right to access is a guarantee that
operates like a promise of insurance embedded in some
larger social arrangement.
Return for the moment to the COBRA statute that
guarantees medical care where persons are in distress or
in labor. The obvious rationale for that statute is that it
requires treatment for persons who need it most. But, by
the same token, it will increase the likelihood that
persons will be in extremis. The question of whether one
needs medical care is in part a function of accidental
circumstances beyond anyone's control, and in part a
function of care levels taken before illness occurs. If
people know they will have to bear both the costs of
precaution and the costs of extreme medical care, then
they will seek to minimize the sum of both sorts of
expenses, however imperfectly. If certain levels of care ex
ante will reduce the risk of serious medical catastrophe,
there will be a strong incentive to take that care. But
once it is known that some other party will have to bear
the costs of medical care in extremis, then the costs of
getting into that condition is lowered, even if it still
remains high. Therefore, there is a greater risk that early
precautions will not be taken, thereby increasing the
likelihood of a subsequent crisis.
Thus, if a woman knows that she must be admitted
to a hospital when she is in active labor, she has less
incentive to arrange for pre-natal care. There is then a
greater chance that she will arrive with serious medical
problems at a hospital, without medical records, and
receive treatment which will be more expensive due to
her serious condition. There are even instances of
women unhappy in the final days of pregnancy taking
cocaine to induce an early delivery. It is clear that not
every woman will adopt behavior this radical, because
COBRA is in place. Indeed, it is quite possible very few
women would contemplate this strategy. But social
questions must be analyzed with a view toward the

problem of large numbers, so that at the margin the set of
incentives created by the legal system will in practice
make a difference.
The situation is not that different from the position
with the homeless. 6 The greater the guarantees of
shelter (or medical care) the more likely it is that these
services will be used. One cannot act as though the
question of distribution of care, given need, is the only
question that has to be confronted to solve the right to
access question. There is also the question of what is the
frequency and severity of the underlying condition for
which the remedy is provided. As a matter of first
principle, we know that it is not constant.
The problems are still more complicated because
there is a question of the distribution of the burden that
follows from the adoption of the public choice to impose
access duties upon hospitals. Under the current system
the choice of which institution is left exclusively in the
hands of the individual person entitled to exercise the

The problem here is not
unique but crops up
wherever mandatory benefits
are imposed by laws that do
not require the government
to fund the social obligation
that it imposes.
access right. There is nothing to prevent all people
within the class from travelling to the single hospital that
they regard as best able to meet their needs, and after
COBRA, with its heavy sanctions, there is little that can
be done to limit access on the other side. The net effect
of this arrangement is that the regulated hospitals lose
large control over their budgets: they have no direct
control over which people they take in or over how many
people they take in. At the University of Chicago
Hospitals, for example, as many as 35% of the beds have
been occupied by patients admitted through the emergency room, most of whom must be taken in and treated
under COBRA, wholly without regard to any reimbursement, either public or private. A hospital that can
operate in the black on its own budget could be pushed
into financial difficulties if it is located in an area that
exposes it to the risk of substantial forced utilization.
In the short run, it looks as though there is only a
transfer of wealth to those who need it from those who do
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not, but the indirect effects make the overall analysis far
more complicated. The budget controls exercised by
COBRA reduce the expenditures available for other
programs, and may compromise the ability of the hospital
to engage in planning for long term improvements. In
the long run, closing down or reorganization is always a
possibility for hard-pressed institutions, and short of that
a curtailment of other beneficial health programs. It is
just impossible to say what the magnitude of these effects
are, but they cannot be inconsiderable, given the size of
the subsidy that is conferred under the Act. It is unwise
to ignore them.

MANDATED BENEFITS
This situation could be substantially altered if the
financial obligation associated with the duty of access
were transferred from the host institution to the general
health care system, where it could be funded by general
revenue taxes, where the risks of overconsumption are
reduced but not eliminated. The problem here is not
unique to the provision of welfare benefits, but crops up
wherever mandatory benefits are imposed by laws that do
not require the government to fund the social obligation
that it imposes."7 It can happen with rent control statutes
that require landlords to rent out units at below market
prices; or with statutes that require employers to issue
insurance (as with AIDS patients) at a fraction of market
prices, at least if they wish to issue insurance at all; or with
statutes that require landowners to admit disabled persons by altering the condition of their facilities at their
own expense.
There is a unifying theme. In each case the choice
of off-budget financing is not simply a question of redistribution of the burdens and benefits of society. It also has
an intimate effect on the quantity of goods and services
that are supplied as well. Where the state mandates that
the care be given, but insists that a designated group of
private parties pay for it, the state will opt for more rather
than less extensive duties. The mandated benefit is
another form of externality (we receive, you pay) which
results, if not in excessive consumption, then in consumption above and beyond what would otherwise be
demanded if the state picked up the tab, say by reimbursing the hospital for the cost of care (not easy to determine
in a world of high fixed costs and lots of joint ones) in
each hospital. There is in short a public choice dimension to the provision of health care, just are there iswith
any other service. The risk of government failures offsets
the dangers of market failures.
With the financial constraint comes the modest
urge to economize, to try to route the care of the needy to

hospitals that are low cost providers of the service. With
the financial constraint comes the modest incentive to
limit access, or even to collect some reimbursement from
the parties who have received the direct benefit of the
services in question. Indeed it is precisely the unwillingness to face the budget questions directly that lead
modem American legislatures at all levels to specialize in
mandates instead of direct payments. Yet once the same
idea is tried more than once, there is no way to instill any
sense of fiscal responsibility. The indirect harms are
difficult to measure, and the inability of private institutions to work well under regulation is then treated as a
further justification for imposing yet other restrictions
and regulations of hospitals and others. With the politics
of access rights there is no way to determine when a policy
has succeeded or failed. There is only a strong incentive
to demand that more be done.
CONTROLLING THE COST SIDE
The argument thus far has shown that there is no
easy way to overcome the obvious problem that pervades
medical care: there is no easy way to guarantee service to
those who need it but cannot pay for it. The usual
responses are to mandate the benefit, and then to ignore
all the indirect financial consequences that flow from
this policy choice. The alternative way to look at the
problem is to ask, what if anything can be done to lower
the cost of access so that medical care becomes more
affordable in an ordinary market? The point of dealing
with the cost side is simple enough: whatever the
imperfections of a market in health care, more care will
be purchased if that care can be provided at a lower unit
cost. How then might those costs be reduced?
For convenience, it is instructive to isolate two
different sets of costs that should be taken into account.
First, there are the costs that are directly and uniquely
associated with the provision of medical care. Thus, at
one level it might be possible to increase access to
medical care by relaxing the licensing limitations on
physicians, or by allowing various kinds of group practice.
In addition, it might be possible to deregulate the care
that must be provided under employee benefit plans.
Once employers are told that if they choose to provide
any medical care, they must provide a long list of benefits,
it may well be that they will choose to provide no one any
benefits at all. The plan itself if chosen without regulation could have promised net benefits of $X per employee. The regulation imposes a set of restrictions that
costs $Z more than the benefits that they provide. Employers and employees are better off with no plan, and $0
gain, than with an enhanced plan and a loss equal to $Z-
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$X. The repeated references to the decline in the
percentage of employees covered by employee benefit
plans may be attributable to just this problem of insisting
that all medical plans cover expensive specialties, psychiatric care, dental care or whatever.
Next there is the issue of medical malpractice
liability, where the present law makes it quite clear that
individuals cannot contract out of the present negligence
system in exchange for a lower price for the services
rendered.18 There are many reported instances where
health clinics specializing in care for the poor cannot
remain in business, or cannot expand their services
because they cannot meet the malpractice bill that the
state insists it pay.' 9 The evidence points to the way in
which professional malpractice liability has led to a
decrease in services available to the poor. There is yet
another situation where malpractice law imposes a budget allocation on patient and provider that neither would
choose voluntarily. The standard response from providers of health care to the poor is a larger subsidy for the
malpractice costs.2 0 It is not to move to a regime of
contract. The right response-to be dogmatic-is for
public agencies and their clients to be able to hire
physicians who limit their liability to their patients by
contract. The greater gains from wider access more than
offset any losses from a marginally increased level of
physician negligence.
The problem of cost is not restricted to direct
medical expenditures. Many of the inputs that are
needed to provide medical care come from labor markets
or real estate markets that are subject to their own forms
of regulation: minimum wage laws, unionization, unemployment insurance, social security laws, workers' compensation benefits. One might believe that it is a crime
to offer a job that promises only a cash wage. These
additional costs drive up the costs of medical care. Yet I
find it almost incomprehensible to see what social policy
is advanced by giving protection to labor monopolies in
the provision of essential services. Real estate and zoning
restriction can drive up the cost of setting up a medical
clinic substantially, and yet these costs too are often
treated as beyond the scope of serious discussion on any
issue of medical care. Yet this simple proposition remains: where the costs are driven up, the access to care
is reduced. Medical administrators are loathe to take up
the cudgels to battle reform in areas that are dominated
by other institutions. But the difficulties that we have
with medical costs are often attributable to choices that
are made in other arenas.

FOUR SOBER SUGGESTIONS
So what then should be done? I have several
cautious suggestions.
First, one should cease to speak of this incredible
morass of regulation and subsidy of medical care as
though it were a market. It is no more a market than the
systems of state provided care that are found in Canada
and Europe, and may be as misguided as are those programs. It is a tough empirical call that I am not prepared
to make.
Second, do not act as though the argument that all
persons are entitled to adequate medical care regardless
of their ability to pay isa self-evident trump that displaces
all other considerations. To the extent that scarcity
issues are ruled out of bounds at the ground floor, questions of access are sure to be answered incorrectly. The
argument that access must be provided as of right in order
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to overcome the undeniable problems of poor people in
need isa vital consideration, but it isnot a trump. It surely
explains the rise of voluntary charitable care, and may
well justify some public provision of care funded by tax
revenues. But so long as resources are consumed that
might have been devoted to alternative uses, medical
planners and legal analysts cannot act as though the
rectification of one error does not give rise to any alternative dislocations that may be of equal or greater magnitude.
Third, do not seek to justify the claims for direct
access rights by treating the current failures as though
they were market failures. Our markets are shot through
with regulation that is both unique to the medical area
and extensive in other markets, such as labor and real
estate. It is too much to ask hospitals and other health
care providers to restructure the broader rules of the game
under which goods and services are allocated in a complex economy. But it is equally misguided to act as
though internal reforms of the health care system will
restore order if imperfections elsewhere in the system are
left unchanged.
Fourth, do not be optimistic, or try to make others
so. It is clear that costs of health care have gone up and
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will continue to rise. It is also clear that there will be
constant struggles between government and health care
providers to provide subsidies for health care on the one
hand and to subject it to external regulation on the other.
"The Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away," goes a famous
passage from Job. He might have been thinking of the
provision of health care. But when givings and takings
are combined as they are in the current health system,
then everyone emerges the poorer.
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